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ABSTRACT  Despite intensive studies of a large number of fossils discovered during the 
20th century there is no consensus as to the interpretation of the process of hominin evolution. 
Some authors see as many as six genera and some 17 species, while others argue for a single 
lineage from Plio/Pleistocene until today. Such diversity of interpretations of the same facts 
indicates lack of a uniform theoretical basis underlying studies of human evolution. Debates 
can be resolved using basic principles of scientific inquiry – parsimony and falsification of null 
hypotheses. Hypothesis testing is now possible with respect to the evolution of basic hominin 
characteristics such as brain size, body size and the size of the dentition that have sample sizes 
of a few hundred individual data points each. These characters display a continuous change 
with time. Analyses of variance do not falsify the null hypothesis of the existence of only one 
species at any time – variances around regression lines on time do not differ from the variance 
observed in the single species of Homo sapiens – distributions of residuals are normal. Thus, 
splitting of the hominin lineage into coeval species can only be based on descriptive character-
istics that are liable to errors of subjective judgment.
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Understanding of the evolutionary pro-
cess that produced modern humans is of 
crucial importance for the way people 
perceive themselves and their lives. It in-
forms ideologies underlying political and 
economic decisions. Thus it is important 
to have this process documented and inter-
preted in accordance with the best rules of 
scientific practice. Despite over 150 years 
of studies of human evolution, debates on 
how our major traits – such as mental ca-
pacities and erect bipedal locomotion – 
emerged are still ongoing [Carruthers and 
Chamberlain 2000, Cela-Conde and Ayala 
2007]. The number of validly named hu-
man species by the end of the 20th century 
exceeded 50 [Meikle and Parker 1994, 
Henneberg 1997], while it has been pro-
posed that an even larger number should 
be identified [Tattersall 1987] and actually 
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has recently [Brown et al. 2004]. It does 
not add, though, to the clarity of the pic-
ture of our origins.
Over the last half-century several au-
thors proposed that the parsimony and fal-
sification of hypotheses should be applied 
to studies of human evolution postulating 
a “single species hypothesis” [Brace 1967; 
Wolpoff 1968, 1971]. According to Hunt 
[2003], Frank Livingstone proclaimed 
himself to be the proponent of single spe-
cies hypothesis still at the beginning of the 
21st century. Kevin Hunt himself argues 
strongly in support of the single species hy-
pothesis using data on taxonomic diversity 
of large-bodied genera of mammals. Re-
cently Holliday [2003] proposed an inter-
mediate interpretation of hominid diversity. 
He used the notion of syngameon which is 
a network of separate cohesive taxa that ex-
change genes among themselves. He sup-
ported this interpretation with observations 
of gene flow among several species of the 
two genera of baboons – Theropithecus 
and Papio – [Jolly 1993, 2001; Jolly et al. 
1997]. Quintyn [2009] summarized current 
discussions concerning hominin diversity 
and concluded that a temporary ban on cre-
ating new hominin taxa should be imposed 
until a clearer understanding of hominin 
variation can be reached.
Taxonomy, essentialism and the 
concept of species
To make sense of the variety of forms 
that surround us we must be able to reduce 
it to a manageable number of generalizing 
categories that can then be used in various 
thought processes. Thus, the human ten-
dency to categorize: From the time platonic 
idealism arose in classical antiquity to the 
early enlightenment, the task of natural-
ists was perceived as that of discovering 
the ideal pattern of the world of living 
things, the “pattern of creation”. Similari-
ties among individuals were used to distil 
essences of ideal types of their respective 
kinds and those types were then organized 
into nested hierarchies of species, genera, 
families, classes, orders, phyla, etc. [Lin-
naeus 1758]. Thus, conceptually, the small-
est unit of life was a species, not an indi-
vidual. An individual was but an example 
of an ideal species type. Individual varia-
tion was consciously ignored for the sake 
of clarity. Once described, taxa became 
units of study for biologists. Discussions 
about the complexity of life in a particular 
region or the entire world were based on the 
number of species and higher taxa present 
in various environments, the interactions 
still being studied as those between par-
ticular taxa, while descriptions of evolution 
consist of biblical lists of who is a descend-
ant of whom and what the family tree looks 
like [Henry and Wood 2007, Stanford et al. 
2009]. 
As an example, following a suggestion 
by Robert Eckhardt:
And unto Enoch was born Irad: and Irad be-
gat Mehujael: and Mehujael begat Methush-
ael; and Methushael begat Lamech [Genesis 
4:18, 1611].
Homo erctus is descended from Homo habi-
lis, which in turn descended from Australo-
pithecus garhi … [Larsen 2008].
Figure 1 is an example of the classic rep-
resentation of a hominin family tree. Such 
representation may be as well reflecting 
a pattern of creation. No explanations of 
how and why particular branches arose are 
given. No uncertainty as to possible mix-
ing of categories is indicated, nor is there 
uncertainty indicated in separating some 
categories from others.
Taxa are perceived as real entities and 
they can only have two states: existence or 
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extinction; categorically yes or no. Such 
an approach, though producing voluminous 
descriptions, cannot provide explanations of 
the process of evolution since evolutionary 
mechanisms are based on individual varia-
tion and transmission of this variation from 
one generation of individuals to the next. 
It can be argued that before we can analyze 
anything and search for processual explana-
tions, we must first provide a solid descrip-
tion. Such description, however, must be in 
terms that lend themselves to further pro-
ductive analysis. In biology, the use of ar-
bitrarily and sharply delimited categories 
is not conducive to productive analysis. It 
leads rather to “catastrophic” explanations 
in the style of George Cuvier [Brace 1981]. 
Taxonomic descriptions may be useful in 
certain applications, such as ecology, but 
the fact that they ignore individuals and the 
flow of time from generation to generation 
is always a limiting factor. 
Currently there exist some 23 definitions 
of species [Mayden 1997, Quintyn 2009]. 
They all attempt to “salvage a Linnean rank” 
[Lee 2003] in the face of the overwhelming 
understanding that life is variable and no 
stable categories actually exist. Following 
Lee [2003], current concepts of species can 
be subdivided into (1) similarity concepts 
using phenetic resemblance of organisms as 
the sole criterion, (2) cohesion concepts in 
which organisms are purported to share fea-
tures allowing them to remain coherent from 
generation to generation, (3) monophyly 
concepts stressing membership of a single 
nonreticulating lineage, and (4) interbreed-
ing concepts in which members of a species 
exchange genes among themselves while 
being reproductively isolated from others. 
Concepts belonging to the first three groups 
are valid for any taxonomic rank, not be-
ing specific to species. Depending on how 
strictly one defines phenetic similarity, level 
of cohesion or monophyletic inclusiveness, 
one can define supraspecific taxa (like ge-
nus) or infraspecific groupings (like races). 
The interbreeding concepts emphasize that 
actual exchange of genetic material oc-
curs only within a species [Mayr 1969, 
Fig. 1. Scheme originally published on page xxix of the Encyclopedia of Human Evolution and Prehisto-
ry [Tattersall et al. 1988] and repeated with modification in the second edition [Delson et al. 2000], author’s 
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1995], a phenomenon which is unique to 
this taxonomic rank and making it the only 
“real” supraindividual biological unit. 
This is the unit of evolution because it is 
in the process of differential reproduction 
of populations isolated genetically from 
other populations that the adaptive change 
in gene pool can occur. The phylogenetic 
species concept stresses the same phenom-
enon of reproductive continuity, but from 
a point of view of change through time 
– all descendants of a particular ances-
tor are a taxon [Velasco 2009]. A specific 
variety of this approach is the genomic- 
phylogenetic species concept [Staley 
2009] inferring evolution of an organism 
from sequences of its genes. 
In all definitions, however, boundaries 
of species are imprecise because reproduc-
tive isolation is often incomplete with in-
ter-species gene flow occurring at various 
rates, while it takes a minimum of three-
generations for a monophyletic lineage 
(phylogenetic species) to separate from 
others [Samadi and Barberousse 2009]. In 
this situation, an audacious solution to the 
removal of the ambiguity inherent in the 
biological species concept has been pro-
posed. Gonzalez-Forero [2009] postulates 
that in situations of relaxed reproductive 
isolation, some populations should be con-
sidered members of more than one species. 
This should be reflected in their trinomial 
nomenclature. An example relating to ho-
minins would be Homo neanderthalensis-
sapiens. 
Despite a multitude of theoretical means 
of reconciling a descriptive platonic cat-
egory with the current understanding of 
biology, when dealing with fossil material, 
only morphological similarity, and mor-
phological variation, are available for study 
and must be used for testing taxonomic hy-
potheses. It is impossible to test directly 
whether a Neandertal man and a modern 
woman would produce fertile offspring. 
For a test falsifying a hypothesis of their 
conspecificity we must rely on secondary 
inferences derived from comparisons of 
morphology and partly reconstructed DNA 
sequences.
Individual variation and 
Darwinian view of life
In reality, only individuals exist at a par-
ticular point in time. Some of them are 
more similar to each other than to many 
other individuals. Such similar individu-
als can be grouped together into a similum 
[Henneberg and Brush 1994, Henneberg 
1997] without any prejudice as to their for-
mal taxonomic status. Simila are defined 
solely by mutual similarities of individuals 
to each other, not by a similarity of indi-
viduals to some idealized, immutable type. 
Simila are thus capable of changing con-
tinuously through time, while taxa are not 
because their change requires abrupt ap-
pearance of a new ideal type. In most cases 
of metazoans, observation of individuals 
over a period of their lives reveals that they 
mate with other members of the similum 
to produce new individuals who undergo 
a process of ontogenetic development and 
growth. During this process individuals 
change their physical form, physiology and 
behavior, sometimes to a very large extent. 
Depending on their sex, individuals may 
differ so substantially in their characteris-
tics that they may be mistaken for different 
species [Manning and Dawkins 1998]. In 
extant organisms it is easy to study ontoge-
netic processes and assess sexual dimor-
phism, although it may happen that various 
ontogenetic stages, or different sexes, may 
mistakenly be described as separate species 
[Eckhardt 2000]. Even when ontogenetic 
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and sexual variations are known, there re-
mains substantial interindividual variation 
due to both genetic polymorphism and vari-
ous responses to environmental stimuli dur-
ing ontogeny. This variation can hardly be 
categorized.
Brain size, especially when related to body 
size, is amongst the most prominent defin-
ing characteristics of Homo sapiens. Yet its 
variation is very substantial – CV approach-
es 12% [Henneberg 1990] compared with 
about 4% for body height and 10% for arm 
circumference (approximate values calcu-
lated from Frisancho [1990] data of anthro-
pometric standards). In absolute figures, the 
range for modern human cranial capacity ex-
tends from 3 standard deviations (SD) below 
the mean at 879 ml to 3 SD above the mean 
at 1821 ml [Henneberg 1990]. This is more 
than double the minimum value. Amongst 
adults only about one quarter of this variation 
is explained by sexual dimorphism, another 
quarter or so can be attributed to differences 
among populations, while the remaining 50 
percent occurs among same-sex individu-
als in the same population (Fig. 2, Henne-
berg [1990]). Were we to add variation re-
sulting from ontogenetic doubling in brain 
size, what seems to be an obvious species- 
specific “big brain” characteristic would 
have a range of variation so wide as to be 
almost worthless for any diagnoses. Over 
centuries, the variation of brain size is fur-
ther added to by microevolutionary trends. 
During the Holocene Homo sapiens cranial 
capacity decreased in size by about 10% 
from the beginning of this period to its end 
[Henneberg 1988, 1998] while in the Anthro-
pocene (considered to start in the late 18th 
century), due to general secular increase in 
body size, it increased again by about 6% 
in some countries [Henneberg et al. 1985]. 
Such changes would be undetectable during 
the Plio/Pleistocene due to technical errors 
of dating methods that may extend to a few 
thousand years [Eckhardt 2000]. 
In paleoanthropology, when individual 
fossils are found, in most instances it is dif-
ficult to be sure of their sex, and their devel-
opmental age is sometimes debatable (see 
uncertainties in the developmental ages of 
the Taung Child and Nariokotome Boy, 
Lacruz et al. [2005], Walker and Leakey 
[1993]) and their membership of a partic-
ular local population, as opposed to some 
other one, unknown. Dating methods of 
Pliocene and Pleistocene fossils have wide 
error ranges, easily incorporating several 
hundreds of years during which microevo-
lutionary changes could occur [Eckhardt 
2000]. The situation is further complicated 
by the fragmentary nature of fossils. In this 
situation, researchers attempt to perform 
a multivariate assessment based on all traits 
that can be estimated from a given fossil. It 
usually takes form of a descriptive and cat-
egorical, rather than metrical, analysis and 
leads to attributing a fossil to an idealized 
taxon, usually a species. When the multi-
variate “appearance” of a particular fossil 
is somewhat different from previously de-
scribed fossils it is left to an arbitrary deci-
sion of researchers whether to assign it to 
one of the already established “species” or 
Fig. 2. Components of variance in the human 
brain size.
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to a new one. The amount of variation that 
can be tolerated within one species is still 
debated [Cope and Lacy 1992, 1996; Al-
brecht and Miller 1993; Kelley 1993; Plav-
can 1993; Rose and Bown 1993; Plavcan 
and Cope 2001; Ackermann et al. 2006]. 
Uncertainties abound, especially because 
there are so many different definitions of 
species. The Latin word specere means 
simply “a kind” or “a form”, thus anything 
looking like a new kind or new form of or-
ganism can be designated as a new species. 
Since there are no two organisms that look 
precisely alike in all details – even identi-
cal twins differ somewhat on closer inspe-
ction – researchers must judge whether the 
form of this particular fossil they are try-
ing to classify differs from other similar 
forms more than expected for members of 
the same species, or less. Some definitions 
of species, especially those akin to the 
Biological Species Concept [Mayr 1969, 
1995], allow for the existence of fairly 
wide ranges of intraspecific variation, 
while others, such as especially the Phylo-
genetic Species Concept or morphological 
species concepts, may consider any “diag-
nosable” difference as defining a new spe-
cies, thus narrowing substantially allowa-
ble ranges of intraspecific variation [Hen-
nig 1966, Platnick 1977a,b, Eldredge and 
Cracraft 1980, Nelson and Platnick 1981, 
Mishler and Donoghue 1982, Mishler and 
Brandon 1987, De Queiroz and Donoghue 
1988, Nixon and Wheeler 1990, Kimbel 
and Rak 1993, Mishler and Theriot 2000]. 
This increases the arbitrariness of deci-
sions assigning particular specimens to 
previously known species or to new ones. 
Once a new species is created, it replaces 
a particular specimen, or sample of speci-
mens in consideration of phylogenies, that 
is, in descriptions of the process of macro-
evolution. Production of phylogenies does 
not explain processes of evolution but pro-
vides only a static description of its course. 
A phylogeny is only as good a description of 
the course of evolution as are the definitions 
of species and other taxa that are included 
with it. Were the taxa incorrectly identified, 
or incorrectly characterized, the descrip-
tion of the process of evolution would be 
faulty. Thus, any attempts at explanations 
of evolutionary processes operating dur-
ing such phylogeny would be incorrect. In 
common descriptions of hominin evolution 
many homoplasies are identified, mean-
ing that supposedly the same adaptations 
evolved separately in various hominin taxa 
[Holliday 2003, Lieberman et al. 1996]. 
This might be true, accepting correctness of 
the standard phylogeny, but it might not be 
true if individuals assigned to separate taxa 
actually belonged to a single polymorphic 
species that was evolving as a whole. Then, 
various individuals of such species are ex-
pected to have same adaptations. 
Construction of phylogenies based on-
species that are considered ideal static 
descriptions of organisms of a particular 
“kind”, imposes on the explanations of tran-
sitions from one taxon to the next abrupt, 
largely unexplainable events in the form 
of “punctuations” [Eldredge and Gould 
1972] rather than adaptive processes based 
on generation-by-generation reproductive 
success of some variants over others. The 
use of platonic ideal entities – immutable 
species – prevents an understanding of the 
actual mechanism of evolution and factors 
that play a role in evolutionary changes. 
As Charles Darwin [1859: 485] himself re-
marked “… we shall at least be freed from 
the vain search for the undiscovered and 
undiscoverable essence of the term spe-
cies.” He also stated that he does not see any 
substantial difference between the notion 
of variety and a species. His explanation 
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of the way life evolves rests on the obser-
vation that individuals are variable, that 
they are adapted to their living conditions 
only to a certain degree and that those who 
happen to be best adapted at a given mo-
ment have greater reproductive success 
than others. Life consists of assemblages 
of individuals who, though clustering into 
groups based on mutual similarity, are 
variable and reproduce with different suc-
cess that is a measure of their adaptation to 
momentary conditions. Those conditions 
change through time and thus midpoints of 
ranges of variation of individuals shift with 
the passage of time. 
Identification of the human lineage
With regard to human ancestry, research-
ers are faced with a difficult task that au-
tomatically produces a conflict between 
identification of taxonomic diversity and 
lineage continuity. The only way to identify 
human ancestors in the fossil record is to 
find among assemblages of primate fossils 
from the Miocene, Pliocene and Pleistocene 
those skeletal remains that resemble humans 
more than other primates. As one goes back 
in time, having already identified human-
like fossils at a later date, one can then try to 
compare even earlier fossils with those lat-
er ones and so on. Eventually, one enters 
the epoch that contains no fossils whose 
similarity to later putative human ancestors 
can convincingly be shown. At present, 
this process has reached back some 6-7 
Ma, identifying forms such as Sahelan-
thropus chadensis and Orrorin tugenensis 
as possible earliest hominins (Stanford et 
al. 2009). The necessity to identify fossils 
somehow similar to those that are similar to 
humans, while the density of fossil record 
decreases on going back in time, reduces 
the reliability of the identification of the 
earliest human ancestors. For later periods 
that have more abundant fossil representa-
tion, greater number of individual fossils 
necessarily produces greater variability of 
morphological characters. This, coupled 
with the tendency to categorize, and with 
the common belief that evolution proceeds 
by emergence of new species, leads most 
researchers to splitting of the Pliocene and 
Pleistocene fossil record into numerous 
species while also recognizing that they 
can be organized into chronological grades 
[Henry and Wood 2007]. We are therefore 
left with a picture of human evolution in 
which the necessary use of similarities to 
identify our ancestors and the natural in-
dividual, regional, microevolutionary and 
sexual variation act in opposite directions 
– reducing and increasing postulated di-
versity. Disputes regarding detailed mor-
phological, chronological and geographi-
cal characteristics of particular fossils can 
continue interminably, unless some gen-
erally accepted method of distinguishing 
intra-specific variation from inter-specific 
diversity can be applied.
Quantitative testing of the 
hypothesis of human lineage
The 20th century produced a large, tem-
porally and geographically widespread fos-
sil record of hominins. Thus, detailed de-
bates regarding small number of individual 
fossils can be replaced by a generalizing 
overview using statistical methods of hy-
potheses testing to resolve the perennial 
dispute between “lumpers” and “splitters”. 
The approach to testing hypotheses of hu-
man evolution should conform to the ba-
sic rules of scientific methodology: par-
simony and null hypothesis falsification. 
We should use the commonly accepted ap-
proach in which a null hypothesis must be 
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falsifi ed before alternative hypotheses can be 
entertained. In the case of fossil documenta-
tion of hominin lineage, the null hypothesis 
that it consisted of one species at each point 
in time can be reasonably built based on the 
general consideration of the speciosity of 
genera of large eurytopic mammals [Conroy 
2002, Hunt 2003]. Such genera usually com-
prise just one or two species. This is true of 
the hominid genera Pan, Gorilla and Pongo. 
Although the number of hominin fossils 
is of the order of thousands of specimens, 
these are fragmentary. Thus sample sizes 
for determination of their various detailed 
characteristics can be small. It is practical 
to analyze for the largest possible number 
of fossils general characteristics that can be 
uniformly reconstructed from various parts 
of skeletal elements. These are: body size 
and cranial capacity. The latter is still exten-
sively used to characterize various putative
hominin species [Wood and Richmond 
2000]. One can add to those generalizing 
characteristics the direct metric character-
istics of dentition since teeth preserve well 
in the fossil record.
The study of variation in some 210 ho-
minin brain sizes, some 205 body size es-
timates and 915 sizes of dentition [Hen-
neberg and Thackeray 1995; Henneberg 
and de Miguel 2004; Henneberg 1997, 
2006, 2008] invariably shows that there is 
a gradual change in those characteristics 
through geological time, that distributions 
of individual values around regressions 
describing temporal changes are unimo-
dal, normal and of the magnitude not dif-
ferent from that of a single modern species 
Homo sapiens. The scattergrams of body 
height, mass and cranial capacity (Fig. 3) 
illustrate temporal continuity without 
abrupt changes and branching. 
Fig. 3. Body height, mass and cranial capacity of hominins from Pliocene to the end of Pleistocene. All 
scales logarithmic. Note continuity of distributions and lack of branching. All available in the literature:
cranial capacities of adult hominins are used (N = 209, as reported by de Miguel and Henneberg [2001], 
supplemented from more recent literature). Reconstructed body heights and weights of hominins from 
Mathers and Henneberg [1995] and de Miguel and Henneberg [1999]. 
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The averages of the “total dental mate-
rial” [Tobias 1988], that is, the sum of hori-
zontal crown areas of all teeth, of various 
hominin taxa do not differ more than av-
erages of various modern human groups 
(Fig. 4) with exception of the robust aus-
tralopithecines. Since total dental mate-
rial is a composite variable and diffi cult to 
calculate for individuals, its variation can 
only be estimated. Here we use an SD es-
timate of approximately 100 mm2 derived 
from Brace et al. [1991]. When intervals of 
2 SD are built around averages for various 
groups, most of the variation among hom-
inin taxa averages is included in those in-
tervals (see Fig. 4). 
There is only one exception from the 
pattern of brain and body size change 
through time in the hominin lineage [Hen-
neberg 2007, Martin 2007]. It is the single, 
unfossilized skeleton labeled LB1 found, 
together with isolated bone elements and 
teeth of a few other humans on the island of 
Flores, Indonesia in 2003–2004 [Brown et 
al. 2004, Morwood et al. 2004, Brumm et 
al. 2006]. Both its body size (1.06 – 1.35 m) 
and cranial capacity (about 430 ml) fall 3 to 
5 SD below the distributions for other ho-
minins of similar dating (Late Pleistocene) 
while size of the dentition is close to the av-
erage. The fi nd has been, and still is, hotly 
debated as a number of authors proposed 
that it is a pathologically deformed individ-
ual, not a representative of a new species 
[Henneberg and Thorne 2004, Jacob et al. 
2006, Weber et al. 2005, Hershkovitz et al. 
Fig. 4. Average total tooth areas for various hominin taxa compared with several averages and 2 
standard deviation ranges for various modern human groups. Note that differences between hominin 
species are of the same order as those between modern human populations. The only exception are robust 
australopithecines. Data for all australopithecines, H. habilis, H. erectus and H. sapiens (modern) from 
Tobias [1988], for Neandertals from Brace and Mahler [1971], for Nubians from Calcagno [1989], for 
Early Upper Palaeolitic and Mesolitic Europe from Frayer [1978], for Australian Aborigines and for 
French from Brace [1995]. 
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2007, Martin et al. 2006a,b, Obendorf et 
al. 2008]. It has been suggested that its dat-
ing is incorrect and it is a modern human 
[Henneberg and Schofield 2008]. Until this 
debate is resolved, we can assume that this 
exception is a result of doubtful attribution 
rather than a challenge to the general pic-
ture of hominin evolution.
The recent description of a large as-
semblage of 4.4 Ma old fossils of the Ar-
dipithecus ramidus [White et al. 2009] fits 
the pattern well. The cranial capacity of 
300–350 ml and body height of 1.2 m could 
be predicted by extrapolating backwards in 
time the trends already documented (see 
Fig. 3).
Conclusion: A single variable, 
adapting lineage
It can be concluded that at no point in 
time since the late Miocene in the distribu-
tions of basic metric characteristics of ho-
minins are there to be found any significant 
discontinuities, deviations from normal-
ity or ranges expanded beyond what is ob-
served in the only living hominin species. 
Although arguments can be made that upon 
a study of descriptive characteristics some 
categorical discontinuities can be detected, 
the subjective nature of the descriptions 
makes it difficult to objectively test such 
arguments. Thus the null hypothesis that 
hominins are a single lineage cannot be fal-
sified and must be accepted at the present 
time. This is the most parsimonious and 
simplest interpretation able to be made. It 
is also compatible with the way by which 
hominin ancestors are identified among 
fossils.
Since the Miocene, we are dealing with 
populations of interbreeding, geographi-
cally widespread ecologically eurytopic 
[Henneberg 2001] human individuals 
who, responding to the pressures of nat-
ural selection, and later to the forces of 
artificial selection resulting from self-am-
plifying feedbacks between human biolo-
gy, technology and culture [Bielicki 1969, 
Strzałko and Henneberg 1982], change to-
wards modern human form. The present-
day human similum comprises a variety 
of individuals bearing signs of their an-
cestral adaptations to the same wide range 
of climatic and economic conditions as 
it was in the past, except that over time 
the external conditions to which adapta-
tions occurred were different and those 
conditions changed over time due both to 
natural forces and human activities. Such 
an interpretation of human evolution is 
simpler than the long litany of fossil “spe-
cies” changing abruptly and inexplicably 
from one to another. Most importantly, it 
allows us to focus attention on the proc-
esses of adaptation, explainable in terms 
of Darwinian mechanisms, that led from 
sparse populations of hunter/gatherer ho-
minids to the widespread, very dense and 
numerically dominant form of large mam-
mal.
Notes
This paper was presented (in Polish) at the 
42nd biannual meeting of the Polish Anthropo-
logical Society in Łódź in September 2009. 
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Streszczenie
Mimo bogactwa materiałów zgromadzonych w ubiegłym stuleciu, wśród autorów 
zajmujących się antropogenezą brakuje jednomyślności w rozumieniu tego procesu. Nie-
którzy z nich utrzymują, że w ciągu ostatnich 5 milionów lat istniało 17, lub nawet więcej 
gatunków homininów, inni twierdzą, że było ich znacznie mniej – może zaledwie 2, a nawet, 
że ewolucja człowieka przebiegła w obrębie jednej, niedzielącej się, linii rozwojowej. 
Różne są także interpretacje pojawienia się dwunożności i przyczyn wzrostu względnych 
rozmiarów mózgowia. Nadal toczą się spory o rolę neandertalczyków i pochodzenie ludzi 
o współczesnych cechach morfologicznych. Taka różnorodność interpretacji tej samej bazy 
faktograficznej wskazuje na słabość podstaw teoretycznych, jakimi posługują się zwolennicy 
rozmaitych koncepcji. Słabość ta wynika najprawdopodobniej z tego, że badacze antropo-
genezy rekrutują się spośród absolwentów wielu dyscyplin, zarówno humanistycznych jak 
i przyrodniczych (rzadko biologii) oraz stosują heterogeniczne paradygmaty i niejednolite 
definicje podstawowych pojęć, takich jak gatunek, gen czy specjacja. Przy tym, ze względu 
na światopoglądowe znaczenie wyjaśnienia naszego pochodzenia, istnieją uwarunkowania 
pozanaukowe – ideologiczne, którym różni autorzy ulegają świadomie lub podświadomie 
(ryc. 1). 
W tej sytuacji trzeba zmierzać do rozstrzygnięcia istniejących sporów stosując podstawowe 
zasady postępowania naukowego – falsyfikację hipotez w oparciu o odpowiednio liczne, jed-
nolicie mierzone lub opisywane, materiały. Takie podejście jest możliwe w stosunku do licz-
nych już obserwacji dotyczących podstawowych cech hominidów, takich jak wielkość mózgu, 
rozmiary ciała i uzębienia. Cechy te zmieniały się w ciągu ostatnich 3-4 milionów lat w sposób 
ciągły, nie wykazując rozszczepiania w procesach specjacji. Analiza wariancji rozkładów tych 
cech w poszczególnych okresach chronologicznych nie pozwala odrzucić hipotezy zerowej, 
stanowiącej, że rozkłady te nie różnią się wielkością wariancji wewnątrzgrupowej od rozkładu 
charakteryzującego pojedynczy, i jedyny żyjący obecnie, gatunek Homo sapiens (ryc. 2). 
Rozkład indywidualnych rozmiarów mózgów 210 homininów wokół linii ich regresji na czas 
geologiczny nie różni się istotnie od rozkładu normalnego. Podobnie, rozkłady wielkości 
ciała po usunięciu efektu czasu (datowania) nie odbiegają od normalności (ryc. 3). Wielkość 
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uzębienia rozmaitych postulowanych gatunków homininów, z wyjątkiem masywnych australo-
piteków, waha się w granicach nie przekraczających różnic pomiędzy rozmaitymi populacjami 
człowieka współczesnego (ryc. 4).
Nie da się zatem, w oparciu o te podstawowe cechy, sfalsyfikować hipotezy, że w ciągu os-
tatnich 3-4 milionów lat istniał w każdym momencie tylko jeden gatunek człowieka (lub jego 
przodka). Akceptacja hipotezy alternatywnej, o wielogatunkowości, może być rozważana tylko 
w oparciu o cechy bardziej szczegółowe, mierzone (opisywane) mniej obiektywnie, których 
próby mają mniejszą liczebność, a interpretacja wartości przystosowawczej nie zawsze jest 
jasna. Badania antropogenezy winny w tej sytuacji skoncentrować się na wyjaśnianiu ewolucji 
przystosowań ludzkich, a nie na formalnej opisowej klasyfikacji poszczególnych znalezisk.
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